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The notion of memory laws emerged as recently as the 2000s, and it can be used in a
narrow sense of denoting enactments criminalizing certain statements about the past (such
as Holocaust denial) and in a broad sense as including any legal regulations of historical
memory and commemorative practices. Such regulations are by no means a recent
phenomenon: they hark back to the nineteenth century at the very least. By contrast,
the first bills that explicitly criminalized statements about history were passed in the 1980s
and 1990s, and the notion of memory laws was coined to refer to this legislative
novelty. Even the USSR had no ad hoc statutes to punish “incorrect” claims about the past
and did that, instead, on the basis of the Penal Code’s articles prohibiting “anti-Soviet
propaganda” (e.g. articles 70 and 190.1).
Any discussion of the legitimacy of memory laws in a democratic society has to distinguish
between the laws that introduce criminal penalties for certain historical claims and all other
memory laws (for the sake of simplicity, I will call them “declarative”). In an ideal world,
there should probably be no state-sponsored politics of memory at all, except for education
aimed at the development of critical thinking. In the real world, however, we can hardly
imagine a state without a minimal official history embodied in its institutions, symbols, and
holidays. More than that, history is an important means of legitimizing contemporary
democracy by showing its origins, challenges that it had to face, and its place in the
development of our societies. We can doubt whether this or that particular declarative law
is justified, but it is difficult to claim that the state has no right to express its official point of
view on the events of the past. The problem arises when a government bans alternative
opinions about these events.
Memory laws in the narrow sense are sometimes considered to be “the most controversial
limitation on freedom of expression to have flourished over the past few decades”. Indeed,
strong arguments have been presented both in favor and against them. Arguments in their
support are based on the concept of “militant democracy” that should leave “no freedom to
the enemies of freedom” (as French revolutionary Saint-Just used to say). In contrast, their
adversaries typically invoke the slippery-slope argument according to which limiting
freedoms can lead us too far, and “a government that can tell us what not to say can also
tell us what we must say”. But does not this
argument contradict the abusus non tollit usum principle?
I believe that this principle does not always hold. The question is to what
extent such abuses are likely to occur in a specific case, and when it comes to prohibitions
on claims about the past, this probability is quite high. The potential for
misuse was certainly less obvious in the 1980s and 1990s, when the first memory laws in
the narrow sense came into being, but even then, it was possible to foresee their
unfortunate consequences. Initially conceived as a means of maintaining peace,
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these laws have instead become one of the preferred instruments of the memory
wars within and between many European countries. Today, one can safely claim
that this transformation was very likely to occur.
There are striking differences between the contexts in which memory laws emerged in the
1980s and 1990s in the “old” Western European democracies (such as France, Austria,
Germany, and Belgium) and in which they further developed in the 2000s and 2010s,
when Eastern Europe became the main center of legislative activity regarding the past.
At the turn of the 1990s, the international political climate was largely determined by the fall
of communism and the seemingly decisive triumph of liberal democracy, for which the
formation of the humanistic, victim-centered culture of memory was an important
aspect. The first memory laws were typically adopted in the countries that had
been implicated in the Shoah, and expressed those nations’ repentance
for their participation in that crime.
In contrast, the continuing rise of national populism all across Europe and the formation of
the authoritarian regimes in Russia, Turkey, Hungary, and Poland marked the beginning of
the new century. In the former communist countries, the rise of nationalism was largely
conditioned by the difficulties of the transition period, which exacerbated their century-
old complex of inferiority vis-à-vis the West and historical grievances against their
neighbors. Some of the memory laws adopted in Eastern Europe faithfully reflected the
emergence of a culture of memory that differed substantially from the democratic memory
based on the sympathy toward the victims of history and on the notion of state repentance
for the crimes of the past (genocide being, by definition, a state-sponsored crime).
In Eastern Europe, memories of WWII could not certainly be the same as in the West or in
Russia, because at the end of the war, the region was occupied by one of the victors with
the consent of the others. Communist regimes are normally seen here as a result
of the foreign conquest. In addition, some of these countries were Hitler’s allies, and parts
of their population were actively involved in the Holocaust. Unsurprisingly, the culture of
victimhood in the region has taken a special form of self-victimization of national
communities that view themselves as victims of the Soviets, the Nazis, and even the
West – but not as co-perpetrators of the Nazi and communist crimes. The promulgation of
the Western-style memory laws did not quite match the specificity of the region’s historical
experience.
The first Eastern European memory law was adopted in Poland in 1998 and
criminalized the denial of both Nazi and communist crimes. Since then, several other
countries (the Czech Republic, Hungary, Lithuania, and Latvia) adopted similar acts, while
Slovakia, Romania, Albania, Slovenia, Macedonia, Montenegro, and Bulgaria followed the
recommendations of the Council of Europe and the EU Council, and passed Western-
style memory laws. The countries of the first group clearly differ from those of the
second: they are typically more developed economically, have a stronger record of anti-
Soviet resistance, feel more vulnerable because of Putin’s neo-imperial ambitions, and are
involved in harsh disputes with Moscow about the past.
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The problem with the typically Eastern European memory laws is not so much that
they envisage fascism and communism as two equally criminal regimes, but that they shift
the blame for historical injustices entirely to others, victimize the past for the nation-
states’ sake, and use history as a means of nationalist mobilization. The 2014 Russian
memory law, which in the midst of the Ukraine crisis criminalized “the dissemination of
knowingly false information on the activities of the USSR during the Second World War”, is
the extreme manifestation of this deplorable tendency, for it openly protects the memory
of an oppressive regime against that of its victims. The only similar legislation is Article 301
of the Turkish Penal Code, which, in 2005, criminalized insults to the Turkish state
and which is normally used against those who recognize the extermination of the
Armenians in the Ottoman Empire as a genocide. In contrast, all other memory laws,
notwithstanding their shortcomings, protect the memory of victims of state-sponsored
crimes.
Eastern European “de-communization” memory laws as well as the Russian statute arose
from the memory wars between Russia and its neighbours, of which the formation of
Putin’s authoritarian regime was the main cause. Indeed, Putin’s ideology is informed by
the Stalinist myth of the Great Patriotic War, which includes the notions of the peaceful
character of Russia’s foreign policy and of the “Yalta System.” It was of course difficult to
predict this particular historical constellation in the 1990s.
Nevertheless, the ease with which memory laws have been overtaken by nationalistic
history politics (and by particularistic memories in some Western
countries, starting with France) can hardly be viewed as purely contingent, and not only
because anti-democratic forces can only profit from the growing punitive trend initiated
by democratic countries. I believe that the cultural form of memory laws has been crucial
for this transformation. Indeed, all such laws without exception ban “heretical” interpretation
of concrete (typically, traumatic) historical events that function as sacred symbols of
national and other communities. Since the end of the twentieth century, Western historical
consciousness has become focused on those events rather than on future-oriented
philosophies of history commonly dismissed as master narratives, while the current rise of
historical memory marked the “crisis of the future” and the decay of “transformative
politics.” Memory laws operate in the realm of symbolism, memory, and myth, in
which nationalism may be more at home than is democracy, whose main strength lies
in its universal future-oriented character.
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